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ARGUMENT 
REPLY POINT I 
CNA Does Not Own The Gross Judgment 
THE CNA POSITION ON APPEAL CONTAINS TWO FATAL 
ASSERTIONS: THAT CNA ACTUALLY OWNS THE 
JUDGMENT, AND THAT THE GROSS JUDGMENT, NOT 
THE NET, IS THE BASIS FOR APPORTIONING ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND COSTS. THESE ASSUMPTIONS ARE CONTRARY 
TO STATUTE AND UTAH SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT. 
A. Introduction. CNA's position on appeal relies heavily on the 
truth or falsity of two underlying assumptions: that CNA owns the judgment: 
and that the parties' rights are based upon the gross judgment. These 
assumptions are contrary to statute and Utah Supreme Court precedent, which 
is a fatal blow to CNA on appeal. 
B. The Two False Assumptions. As to ownership. CNA claims: 
The Esquivels may contend that the fees and costs were taken out of 
"their" judgment, but this, too, would be false. For as the governing 
statute clearly provides, the judgment never really belonged entirely to 
the Esquivels. (emphasis added) 
CNA Brief 27(b).1 A few sentences later, CNA concludes: "Therefore, if the 
attorney fees and costs were paid by anyone, they were actually paid by CNA." 
To find quotes easier, a page is divided into four imaginary vertical sections, (a), (b), 
(c) and (d). Thus, "page 27(b)" signifies a quote somewhere in the second quarter of page 27. 
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(emphasis added) CNA Brief 27(c). In other words, CNA paid all the attorney's 
fees because it owned the gross judgment. 
The second false assumption is that the "gross judgment" determines 
how much CNA is apportioned for attorney's fees: 
But both the statute and simple logic provide that fees and costs can 
only be charged against a gross judgment. . . . CNA was already 
charged once for the fees and costs when the $203,507 judgment was 
reduced to $68,507. It would be illogical and unfair to charge CNA 
with those same expenses a second time, (first italics in original; 
other emphasis added) 
CNA Brief 25(d), 26(b). This convoluted logic is an extension of the "CNA owns 
the judgment" argument since it presumes that CNA has been apportioned all of the 
attorney's fees and costs, satisfying §106(5)(a) of the statute. CNA Brief 26(d). 
These two false assumptions pervade CNA's arguments on appeal. 
For example, there is a big issue here as to whether CNA has been apportioned its 
share of the attorney's fees and costs, as required by §106(5)(a), even though it 
didn't actually pay anything. CNA's claim that it "was already charged once for 
the fees and costs when the $203,507 judgment was reduced to $68,507" only 
makes sense if CNA indeed owns the gross judgment, but it makes no sense 
whatsoever if the Esquivels own the underlying judgment. 
C. CNA's Claim That It Owns the Judgment is Contrary to 
Statute and Case Law. Appellate Procedure Rules 24(b) and (a)(9) require that 
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arguments contain "citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record 
relied on." It is therefore astonishing that CNA offers so little support for this 
crucial argument. For the proposition that the judgment didn't belong to the 
Esquivels, CNA offers only: "Subsection [34a-2-106] (l)(b) authorizes the 
employee or dependents to bring a third-party tort action. Subsection (2) allows 
the insurer or employer to do the same." CNA Brief 28(b). There is no other 
explanation, discussion or case citation for this key argument. This Court has held 
briefs to be noncompliant where there are no relevant citations to the record and 
no analysis of an issue. Christensen v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69, 72 (Utah App. 1991); 
Burns v. Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah App. 1996). 
Contrary to CNA's claims, the governing statute provides that the 
employee owns the action: "the injured employee . . . may have an action for 
damages against the third person." (emphasis added) Section 34A-2-106(l)(b); 
see also, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(4). Utah law further provides that a 
personal injury action is owned by the injured person.2 
However, Section 106 does provide that the insurance carrier "shall 
become trustee of the cause of action against the third party." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34A-2-106(2)(a)(i). (emphasis added) Nowhere is the carrier referred to as, or 
2
 Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(l)(p) (definition of "property"); § 78-27-38 (comparative 
negligence statute); and Utah Constitution Article I, Section 11 (courts open to every person 
"for injury done to him and his person . . . [and] shall have remedy by due process of law"). 
3 
implied to be, "the owner" of the cause of action. On the contrary, "the employer 
or insurance carrier is made 'trustee,' not 'assignee/ of the cause of action." 
Oliveras v. Four-Corners Caribou, Inc., 598 P.2d 1320, 1324 (Utah 1979). CNA 
apparently confuses its status as a "trustee" with that of an owner. 
A leading Utah case squarely holds contrary to CNA's position, i.e., 
that the injured employee owns the cause of action: 
Considerations of reason and policy impel the conclusion that the 
plaintiff, the one who has suffered the injury and damage, should 
have basic ownership and control of his cause of action. . . . [The 
carrier] is the trustee for the plaintiff, the true beneficiary and owner 
thereof, (emphasis and bracketed portion added) 
Lanier v. Pyne, 508 P.2d 38 at 40 (Utah 1973). Lanier also destroys CNA's 
argument that the gross judgment governs the parties' rights: 
The interest of the carrier extends only to the amount of 
compensation it has paid; and its only real interest is to obtain its full 
reimbursement, (emphasis added) 
Id. CNA obviously cannot have an interest in the gross judgment when its interest 
is limited to reimbursement. 
Professor Larson's venerable text rejects the argument that the carrier 
somehow owns the cause of action or the judgment: "Under most statutes, the 
third party suit, whether brought by the employee or employer, is deemed to be 
primarily the employee's cause of action." Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen s 
Compensation § 75.00 at 14-155 (1995). Larson also characterizes resulting 
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attorney's fees and costs as belonging to the employee, not the employer. See, e.g., 
Id. at § 74.32(a)(1), 14-139-40. 
D. Using Gross Tudgment to Determine Apportionment Is 
Contrary to Statute and Case Precedent. Who the "parties" are helps 
determine whether the gross judgment or net judgment should be used. It stands 
to reason that you can't apportion a non-party's interest anymore than the United 
States could apportion Canadian tax dollars. Worthen confirmed that only 
"parties" are apportioned attorney's fees under §106(5)(a), and the term "parties" 
does not refer to the original third-party defendants "who have no further interest 
in it [the settlement] after paying it over." (emphasis and bracketed portion 
added). Worthen v. Shurtleff & Andrews, Inc., 426 P.2d 223, 225 (Utah 1967). 
Thus, one who has been paid (i.e., the attorney) cannot be a "party" for 
apportionment. 
Is the attorney a "party" for purposes of apportionment, as CNA 
claims? Worthen says "no": 
Therefore, the only possible "parties" who have "interests" in the 
money are Worthen and The State Insurance Fund (the latter being 
entitled to reimbursement). It thus follows that Sec. (1) [current 
§106(5)(a)], with unmistakable clarity requires that the expenses and 
attorney's fees be charged proportionately against these "parties" 
(Worthen and The State Insurance Fund) as their "interests" appear. 
It is more reasonable to assume that the Legislature intended this 
application of the statute which comports with its equitable purpose 
5 
than one which would bring about a contrary result, (emphasis and 
bracketed portions added; parentheticals in original) 
Id. at 225-6. The only possible "parties" for purposes of statutory apportionment 
are the injured employee and the carrier. The attorney to whom money was paid 
cannot be a "party." Since the only lawful "parties" are the Esquivels and CNA, 
they can only apportion the neL judgment because they "have no further interest 
in . . . [the attorney's fees] after paying it over." Id. at 225. 
REPLY POINT II 
No "Balance" to Offset Against Future CNA Liability 
GOING FIRST TO THE "BALANCE" PORTION OF §106(5)(c) 
AND OFFSETTING, AS CNA URGES, IGNORES THE 
"APPORTIONMENT," "CREDIT" AND "REIMBURSEMENT" 
PORTIONS OF THE STATUTE. 
A. Introduction. CNA characterizes this case as "simple" 
because allegedly one skips right to §106(5)(c.) and need only look for a "balance" 
remaining after payment of the attorney's fees. CNA Brief 15(d)-16(a), 17(a). 
CNA's "simple" formula is: 
$203,507.25 - Gross Judgment 
-$154.999.28 - Attorney's Fees and Costs 
$ 68,507.97 - "Balance" -- to the Carrier 
The §106(5)(c) "balance" must then "be applied to reduce or satisfy in full" any 
future carrier obligation, according to CNA. 
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B. Contrary to Statute. CNA's "simple balance" argument 
sidesteps both parts of Subsection (5)(a) {ucharged proportionately against the 
parties" and "to be a credit upon any fee payable by the injured employee"), as 
well as Subsection (5)(h) (reimbursement "less the proportionate share of costs 
and attorney's fees . . . in Subsection (5)(a)"). CNA has skipped a few steps here. 
The priority of §5(a)'s apportionment and "credit" requirements have been 
confirmed by three Utah Supreme Court cases. See extensive discussion in 
Esquivel Brief 10-17, 18-19 and 23(a-b). 
CNA cites no case for its "simple balance" analysis. CNA Brief 19(a-
b). Furthermore, CNA virtually ignores Worthen, supra, which squarely holds 
against its position. Basically, CNA attempts to dismiss Worthen in a footnote on 
page 20 (with only one other brief mention on page 23 of its Brief). CNA does 
not reconcile the Worthen "sequence" requirement that the allocation of attorney's 
fees and costs comes "first" and as a "priority," and that reimbursement goes to 
the insurer only "from funds remaining, and to the extent possible" and "before 
the remainder is allocated to them as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3)." 
(emphasis added) Id. at 226. CNA's feeble attempt to distinguish Worthen is 
tantamount to an admission that Worthen holds against its position. 
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REPLY POINT III 
No Carrier Priority: No Waiver to Defeat Legislative Intent 
THE STATUTE AND CASE LAW DO NOT PROVIDE THE 
CARRIER A "PRIORITY," BUT RATHER PROVIDE A 
PREFERENTIAL RIGHT OF REIMBURSEMENT AFTER 
ATTORNEY'S FEES HAVE BEEN APPORTIONED AND 
CREDITED TO THE EMPLOYEE. THE CARRIER MAY NOT 
MANIPULATE THE STATUTE THROUGH A CONTRIVED 
"WAIVER" TO DEFEAT THE PLAINLY-STATED LEGIS-
LATIVE INTENT THAT THE EMPLOYEE RECErVE A CREDIT 
FOR THE CARRIER'S PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF FEES. 
A. Introduction. CNA claims §106(5) "plainly gives the insurer 
priority over the employee and his dependents . . . in the distribution of the 
proceeds . . . ."3 CNA Brief 19(c), 22(b). CNA then claims a disingenuous 
"waiver" of its §106(5)(b) right to "reimbursement." CNA Brief 17 (c-d). This 
is an attempt to manipulate itself out of (5)(b)'s two hostile provisions which 
deduct from CNA's reimbursement "the proportionate share of costs and 
attorneys fees provided for in Subsection (5)(a)," as well as debits for employer 
negligence greater than 40% (50% in this case). §106(5)(b)(ii). 
B. CNA's Claim is Only a "Preferential Reimbursement." 
CNA inexplicably fails to cite Lanier v. Pyne, supra, a major adverse precedent 
dealing with priority. CNA Brief iii-iv. Lanier addresses the difference between 
a "priority" and a "preference for reimbursement." In Lanier, a cab driver was 
3
 Worthen actually holds the contrary. Worthen, 426 P.2d at 226, Esquivel Brief 19(a). 
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injured in a collision with a truck and was paid $3,301 in benefits. He employed 
attorneys to sue defendant. Liberty Mutual, the worker's compensation carrier, 
secured its own attorney, intervened, and then tried to claim that since it had its 
own counsel "it is not required to participate in proportional payment of the costs 
and attorney's fees incurred by the plaintiff." Id. at 39. The court framed the 
issue as: "whether it [the carrier] must bear its proportionate share of the fees 
paid to the plaintiffs attorneys." (bracketed portion added) Id. 
Lanier explains that although carrier reimbursement is a "first 
preference," it only kicks in after the "sequence . . . in the statute": 
It is because of the policy considerations just stated, and the sequence 
of the grant in the statute, that we think it reasonable to conclude 
that the rights conferred upon the insurance carrier should be 
regarded as secondary to the plaintiffs interests, . . . (emphasis 
added) 
Id. at 40. "Sequence" means apportionment of the attorney's fees occurs before 
reimbursement and offset. See Worthen, 426 P.2d at 226. Hence, the carrier's 
rights are "regarded as secondary to the plaintiffs interest." Lanier, 508 P.2d 
at 40. 
Lanier notes that a post-Worthen amendment to Subsection 
106(5)(b)'s predecessor made even more clear the legislative intent that attorney's 
fees and costs be apportioned first: 
9 
The addition of the emphasized language to the statute seems plainly 
intended to eliminate the previously existing uncertainty and to make 
it clear that "the person liable for compensation payments [Liberty 
Mutual] shall be reimbursed in full for all payments made less the 
proportionate share of costs and attorneys' fees," so that the insurance 
carrier will hear its proportion of these expenses, instead of having 
them come entirely out of the plaintiffs share of the settlement, 
(emphasis added; bracket in original) 
Id. Hence, CNA does not have a "priority," as it claims. It merely has a 
preferential right to reimbursement, according to Lanier, after it bears "its 
proportion of these expenses, instead of having them come entirely out of the 
plaintiffs share of the settlement." Id. The Commission wrongfully awarded 
CNA a "priority" in this case. 
C. No Waiver of Reimbursement to Defeat Legislative Intent. 
CNA claims it waived4 "any right to reimbursement, so paragraph [34A-2-106(5)] 
(b) does not apply." CNA Brief 17(c). There is no altruism here. Rather, this is 
an opportunistic attempt by CNA to manipulate itself out of the explicit 
apportionment requirements in Subsection 106(b), as well as the employer and 
employee fault reduction requirements of Subsection 106(b)(ii) (75% due to the 
respective fault of the employer and employee at 50% and 25%5). 
4
 In a footnote, CNA tries to hedge its bet by claiming that the waiver of "any right to 
reimbursement, however, [is] contingent on receiving a full offset." CNA Brief 17(d). 
5
 This particular point on Subparagraph 106(b)(ii) is largely irrelevant in this case if the 
court agrees with the Esquivels' analysis since the credit for attorney's fees required by 
Subsection 106(a) consumes the entire net judgment and any future offset such that it is not 
necessary even to make the 75% reduction calculations. However, if this court should disagree 
10 
The Lanier court rejected a comparable argument: 
The answer to this argument of Liberty Mutual is that its effect 
would be to allow the insurer, by the simple expedient of declaring in 
advance that it would not abide by the statute [by hiring its own 
attorney], to defeat the plainly stated legislative intent that the 
insurer's reimbursement should be " . . . less the proportionate share 
of costs and attorneys' fees . . . " incurred in the action. This 
certainly was intended to apply to the attorney's fees incurred by the 
plaintiff. The trial court correctly ruled and required Liberty Mutual 
to participate in its proportional share of the costs and attorney's 
fees. . . . (emphasis and bracketed portions added) 
Id. at 39-40. Likewise, this court should reject CNA's transparent legerdemain 
which seeks to avoid mandatory §106(5)(b) apportionment by its disingenuous 
"waiver." In the words of Lanier, this "simple expedient" must be rebuffed. 
REPLY POINT IV 
CNA Had Notice of the Third-Party Action 
THE ESQUIVELS GAVE CNA WRITTEN NOTICE OF INTENT 
TO COMMENCE A THIRD-PARTY ACTION. ADDITION-
ALLY, CNA HAD DE FACTO NOTICE OF THE ACTUAL 
LITIGATION AND HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO ENTER AN 
APPEARANCE, BUT DECLINED TO DO SO. 
A. Introduction. CNA rationalizes the horrible outcome it 
proposes (Esquivels get nothing) by suggesting it is actually the fault of the 
Esquivels' attorneys, who "undisputed[ly]" didn't give CNA notice of the third-
party action. CNA Brief 31 (d)-34. CNA argues: "If their attorneys had simply 
with the Esquivels on the apportionment and priority issues, it should still hold that CNA's 
interest should be reduced by 75% pursuant to Subsection 106(b)(ii). 
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obeyed the statute," the Esquivels somehow could have avoided the "unfortunate 
[result of going] . . . through a lot of effort for no net gain." (bracketed portion 
added) CNA Brief 31 (b), 35(b). These claims are false and distorted. 
B. ALT's Factual Finding of Notice — Undisputed by CNA. 
Whether CNA received notice was hotly disputed. R. 53, 68. In any event, the 
ALJ made a factual finding that CNA did indeed receive written notice of a 
potential third-party lawsuit in 1994. R. 165, HI. A 1994 settlement 
disbursement, signed by CNA, showed $10,000 withheld as an advanced cost for 
possible product liability litigation. R. 124. CNA also received de facto notice 
when CNA's attorney, Ted Kanell, participated in a deposition many months 
before the case actually went to trial. R. 223-4. 
The ALJ concluded: "Thus, it appears that there was a possible third 
party action that could take place and that the respondents were informed about 
it at the time." (emphasis added) R. 165. CNA thereafter disputed this finding 
and argued its case to the Commission. R. 172. The Commission never even 
mentioned the issue, tacitly adopting the findings of fact presented by the ALJ. 
R. 262-3. Such findings of fact are accorded considerable deference and should 
not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. Morton Int'l, Inc. 
v. AuditingDiv., 814 P.2d 581, 585 (Utah 1991). 
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Lastly, opportunistic and self-serving comments that, if notified, 
"CNA would undoubtedly have agreed to contribute to the costs" (CNA Brief 
32(b)) are highly doubtful. CNA never offered to pay costs, despite months of 
notice. 
REPLY POINT V 
Timely Appeal: No Basis to "Discount" 
DISCOUNTING IS NOT REQUIRED OR PERMITTED UNDER 
THE COMMISSION'S REGULATIONS, AS CLAIMED BY 
CNA. ESQUTVELS' APPEAL OF THE COMMISSION'S ORDER 
GRANTING CNA A DISCOUNT ON ITS FUTURE 
OBLIGATIONS WAS TIMELY AND ESQUIVELS HAVE NOT 
WAIVED THEIR OBJECTIONS ON THIS ISSUE. 
A. Timeliness. The ALJ made no determination that CNA's 
obligation to the Esquivels should be "discounted"6 so as to extend the amount of 
future offset to which CNA might be entitled. R. 161-8. Thus, when the 
Esquivels responded to CNA's Motion for Review of the ALJHs Order, the matter 
of discounting was still not at issue. There was no reason to address something 
on which the ALJ had not ruled, i.e., discounting. Discounting only became an 
issue when the Commission misapplied the provisions of the governing statute 
§ 34A-2-106(5) and allowed CNA to reap a windfall to the tune of 122% of the 
6
 CNA's "discounting" argument involves taking the amount of offset to which it claims 
it is entitled, determining the future value of that amount, and applying that augmented amount 
so as to reduce its future obligation to make weekly payments to dependents. It has a crushing 
impact on the decedent's widow and children. 
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Esquivels' net judgment. Plaintiffs ascribe as error the Commission's actions in 
this regard and now appeal that decision at their earliest opportunity. Plaintiffs' 
appeal on this issue is thus timely. 
CNA's cited cases of Brown <St Root Industrial Serv. v. Industrial Comm'n. 
947 P.2d 671 (Utah 1997) andAlvin G. Rhodes Pump Sales, 681 P.2d 1244 (Utah 
1984) are very distinguishable. Litigants in both of these cases received 
unfavorable rulings from the ALJ and thereafter failed to properly raise the 
appropriate objection before the Commission, raising their objections for the first 
time in their appellate brief. In Esquivel, the adverse ruling came not from the ALJ, 
but from the Commission, and the Esquivels appropriately objected to the 
Findings on this matter at the earliest available opportunity. 
B. Discounting Prohibited by Regulation and Case Law. The 
Commission's improper discount to CNA is a question of law, and an appellate 
court will give no deference to an agency's determination. State v. Penay 869 P.2d 
932, 936 (Utah 1994). Departures from agency rules which violate the rights of 
litigants are viewed as unreasonable and irrational. See Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. 
AuditingDiv., 842 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1992). 
CNA claims that "[discounting is required under the Commission's 
regulations." CNA Brief 37. CNA further claims that the three stated instances 
which govern when a discounting or present value computation should be made 
1.4 
are mere "examples" and that Rule R612-1-4 (formerly R-568-1-11) does not 
preclude application to the Esquivels' situation.7 CNA Brief 38. These assertions 
are incorrect. Rule R612-1-4 was never meant to govern "lump sum" awards from 
third-party tortfeasors. The Rule was meant to govern situations where the 
Commission has ordered the employer to make periodic payments to an injured 
employee or his dependents. The rule provides that the injured employee may 
petition the Commission for a "lump sum" of all or part of the benefit award. 
These types of awards, however, are infrequently made because of the desire to 
protect people like the Esquivels. 
This is not a situation where an employee's widow and dependents 
are petitioning the Commission to award a lump sum in lieu of periodic payment. 
Rule R612-1 -4 and Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-421, however, were drafted with that 
very purpose in mind: they were designed to restrict lump sum amounts to 
recipients showing special circumstances, providing for discounting when the 
Commission deemed a lump sum amount to be advisable. Absent some contrary 
legislative provision, the usual remedies under common law should be presumed 
to be in effect. This, of course, includes the ability of the employee to keep his 
7
 In support for its position that the three instances where discounting is allowed are non-
exclusive "examples," CNA cites to the case of Willardson v. Industrial Commission., 904 P.2d 671 
(Utah 1995). This case is of no help to CNA. Willardson concerned a statute which included 
three different examples used to help define what a "significant medical issue" was. Id. In this 
case, however, Rule R612-1-4 does not seek to define anything. 
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judgment or settlement without having the employer "discount" to present value 
the amount it may properly claim as offset under § 34A-2-106(5). 
The case of Texports Stevedores Co. v. Director, 931 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 
1991) is instructive on this point. In Texports, an employer took the position that 
it should be allowed to discount third-party proceeds since a statute existed that 
would allow an employer to do so if the employer had brought and prosecuted the 
action. Finding no statute that would affirmatively grant the employer the right 
to discount, the court refused the employer's request to apply the "reasoning" 
contained in a different statute. Id. at 332. Likewise here, this Court should deny 
CNA's request for discounting based on "reasonable applications" of inapplicable 
statutes, since, as mentioned, no statutory provision exists to allow for it.8 
8Because Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-421 does not allow for discounting under the facts 
of this case, CNA's citation to State Insurance Fund v. Renak, 621 P.2d 714 (Utah 1980), which 
concerned an employee's petition to the state insurance fund for a lump sum payment under the 
predecessor to section 34A-2-421, is inapplicable. See CNA's Brief, 41. If anything, Renak stands 
for the proposition that discounting will only be allowed where the strict terms of Rule 612-1-4 
are complied with. 
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REPLY POINT VI 
No Unfair or Absurd Results 
THE STATUTORY FORMULA PROPOSED BY THE 
ESQUIVELS IS FAIR AND REASONABLE AND DOES NOT 
CREATE ABSURD RESULTS, EVEN THOUGH CNA 
RECEIVES NO OFFSET UNDER THE UNIQUE FACTS OF 
THIS CASE. HOWEVER, CNA'S PROPOSED FORMULA IS 
GROSSLY UNFAIR AND WOULD WORK A CRUSHING 
HARDSHIP ON FUTURE INJURED EMPLOYEES. 
A. Introduction. CNA's recurrent theme is that the statutory 
formula "leads to absurd results," and is unfair because CNA gets nothing. CNA 
Brief 22(a), 21(a), 20, etc. It purports to prove the absurdity with mathematical 
examples (CNA Brief 23), and claims that it is unfairly requited for its generosity 
toward the Esquivels in the settlement of the original third-party action for 
$375,000. CNA Brief 34(d). These arguments are all false or severely distorted. 
B. Inaccurate. Distorted Examples. CNA misrepresents the 
application of the statutory formula with the example of a $50,000,000 judgment 
that "would give CNA a setoff of only $48,857, less than one-third of its lien." 
CNA Brief 23. However, there is an obvious math error in that "absurdity" 
example (147,922 -J- 29,946,404), resulting in a true proportionate share of 
.00494. not 0.494% as CNA claims. This unfortunate and embarrassing math 
error makes, of course, a big difference, since CNA's true proportion of attorney's 
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fees and costs would be only $667 ($134,999 x .0Q4939558), rather than the 
$99,065 claimed by CNA. CNA Brief 23(d), fn. 4. 
CNA also distorts Esquivels' Example No. 3 (Addendum Exhibit 5), 
claiming that it is "patently absurd" to think that such a huge judgment 
($814,000 in the example) "would not be enough to take care of a $20,000 
reimbursement." CNA Brief 23(a). CNA fails to grasp the principle of 
apportionment. To CNA, the only issue is a selfish one: is there enough to "take 
care of its lien" after the attorney's fees are paid? However, the statutory issue 
properly framed is, "What proportion of the attorney's fees and costs is the carrier 
required to pay?" 
Example No. 3 is a hypothetical based on some of the actual facts of 
the case. CNA sees some gross unfairness in making it pay 34% of the attorney's 
fees and expenses, when its interest was exactly 34% of the net judgment. This 
ignores the facts that there is a $379,000 attorney's fee in this hypothetical, 
generated through no effort of CNA, at the entire risk of the Esquivels, of which 
the Esquivels are paying $250,292, or the exact 65% dictated by the Esquivel's 
interest in the net judgment. 
The object is to get the carrier and the employee to each pay a fair 
share of the burden necessarily incurred in producing the "pie" to be divided. 
Under the actual facts ofEsquivel, the attorney's fees and costs amounted to just 
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over two-thirds of the gross judgment, surely a rarity. At the same time, the 
carrier's interest was exceptionally high because it was a death case involving a 
widow and five dependents, paid out over 18 years, also a rarity. Therefore, we 
have a high carrier interest applied against a low net judgment, which produces 
the unusual result. There is nothing "unfair" about it; it is simply unusual. It is 
much more fair to judge the statutory formula by more typical examples, rather 
than judging by the atypical. See, Example No. 4 from Hum v. Nevada Bell, 114 
P.2d 1002 (Nevada 1989) (Esquivel Brief 36) and the more typical examples 
presented by Worthen, Prettyman and Lanier. See Appendix 6. 
C. Prior $375.000 Freeport Settlement. CNA claims that when 
the first liability case against Freeport was settled for $375,000 in 1994, "CNA 
could have insisted on a full offset against any future compensation liability." 
CNA Brief 34(d). There was "more than enough money left over after expenses 
to offset CNA's obligations for many years." CNA Brief 34(d). Although the case 
was settled and is not at issue here, CNA's statements are false and distorted. The 
Freeport settlement is a good example of how the statutory formula should work 
and how unfair CNA's proposed formula would be. 




1 $319,176 • 
• gross settlement 
1/3 contingent attorney's fees plus costs 
• net judgment 
• carrier's Hen 
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R. 68, 34. As noted, the carrier's interest before the settlement amounted to $341 
per week, for 52 weeks per year, for 18 years (until the youngest child, an infant, 
turned 18), or $319,176. CNA would therefore have responsibility to pay all of 
the attorney's fees and costs, or $131,636. That sum would then be credited to 
the injured employee and deducted from the net judgment, leaving the carrier a 
net future offset of $111.728 ($243,364 - $131,636). This is hardly an absurd 
result. It realistically reflects the carrier's true economic interest, and pays the 
carrier accordingly. Under CNA's proposal, however, the entire $243,364 would 
be offset against future benefits, resulting in absolutely nothing to the employee. 
Obviously, our Legislature could never contemplate such an oppressive and 
crushing result. 
CNA's allegation that it was somehow generous with the Esquivels in 
the Freeport settlement is also false. These figures summarize CNA's reduction: 
$341/wk x 52 x 18 = $319,176 [initial lien] 
&205/wk x 52 x 18 = & 191.880 [reduced lien in settlement] 
$136/wk x 52 x 18 = $127.296 [net reduction] 
R. 64,119(b). CNA got a benefit of a $127.296 reduction, but should have only 
had $111.728. and thus "cut a fat hog" to the tune of $15,668, at the expense of 
the widow and children. 
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D. Future Unfairness. CNA ultimately concedes: "It is 
unfortunate that the Esquivels went through a lot of effort for no net gain." CNA 
Brief 35(b). However, CNA's position would work a universal injustice in every 
case. The injustice is self-evident. If there is a "balance" left over after payment 
of the attorney's fees, then the entire sum would be available for full carrier 
reimbursement and offset in every case. This, of course, eliminates apportionment 
of attorney's fees, and often the employee will suffer total offset of the remaining 
judgment and net absolutely nothing. The casualty here, of course, is 
fundamental fairness. 
E. The Breen Formula is Not Based on a Different Statute. 
CNA criticizes Breen v. Caesar's Palace, 715 P.2d 1070 (Nevada 1986), claiming 
that Breen cannot be followed in Utah "because the statute in Nevada is 
significantly different from the statute governing in Utah," and did not require 
that fees be charged proportionately. CNA Brief 24(c). This is a distorted 
representation of Nevada law. 
Although the Nevada statute did not have an explicit apportionment 
provision, the court considered the legislative intent and "the purpose of the 
statute as a whole as evidenced by the statutory scheme," to construe the statutory 
scheme as requiring apportionment. Id. at 1072. Such apportionment is based 
on "fundamental fairness." Id. at 1073. In a nutshell, the Breen court simply 
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construed the inherent structure of the Nevada statute as requiring 
apportionment. It is grossly inaccurate for CNA to claim that the Nevada statute 
"is significantly different" from the Utah statute. More accurately, the Nevada 
statute implies apportionment; the Utah statute explicitly provides for it. 
CONCLUSION 
CNA's Reply Brief is built on a foundation of sand because it relies 
so heavily upon the false assumptions that CNA owns the judgment and that the 
gross judgment is the basis for determining the rights of the parties. Both 
assumptions are contrary to the Utah statute and applicable case law. Heavy 
reliance upon these two faulty assumptions fatally infects CNA's position on 
appeal. 
CNA's "simple balance" approach is defective because it jumps over 
the apportionment, credit and reimbursement portions of the statute, which 
require apportionment of attorney's fees to occur before awarding the balance to 
the insurance carrier. CNA's preferential right of reimbursement applies only after 
attorney's fees have been apportioned and credited to the employee, and is not 
equivalent to a carrier priority. CNA may not waive a statute to defeat plainly-
stated legislative intent. CNA received both written and de facto notice of the 
action. The Esquivels' appeal of the Commission's Order granting CNA a 
discount was timely, and discounting is not available to CNA. There is no 
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unfairness or absurd result in applying the statutory formula as explained by the 
Esquivels. 
Justice requires that the Commission's illogical, unfair and oppressive 
Order be reversed, and the ALJ's decision reinstated. 
DATED this 11th day of September, 1998. 
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Tab 6 
APPLICATION OF STATUTORY FORMULA 





Carrier's Proportionate Share 
Carrier's Share of Expenses 
(% x fees + costs) 
Employee's Share of Expenses 
(total expenses - carrier's share) 
Net Reimb/Offset to Carrier 









































Note: The gross settlement, attorney's fees, and carrier's lien figures are based upon the actual facts 
of each case, except where noted. The other figures are mathematical calculations. The net 
reimbursement to carrier is the amount that the carrier "should receive" upon proper application of 
the formula. As noted in Esquivel Brief 31-4, the attorneys in these cases did not make a request 
based upon the statutory formula, but in most cases made a request simply for one-third of the 
carrier's lien. 
In some cases, costs are not known. 
2
 Estimated; fees and costs not disclosed. 
